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Abstract
The evolution of the case law in the field of free movement
of goods has been marked by consecutive changes in the
legal tests applied by the Court of Justice of the European
Union for the determination of the existence of a trade
restriction. Starting with the broad Dassonville and Cassis de
Dijon definition of MEEQR (measures having equivalent
effect to a quantitative restriction), the Court subsequently
introduced the Keck-concept of ‘selling arrangements’,
which allowed for more regulatory autonomy of the Mem-
ber States, but proved insufficient to capture disguised trade
restrictions. Ultimately, a refined ‘market access’ test was
adopted, qualified by the requirement of a ‘substantial’ hin-
drance on inter-State trade. Contrary to the free movement
of goods, the free movement of capital has not undergone
the same evolutionary process. Focusing on the ‘golden
shares’ case law, this article questions the broad interpreta-
tion of ‘capital restrictions’ and seeks to investigate whether
the underlying rationale of striking down any special right
that could have a potential deterrent effect on inter-State
investment is compatible with the constitutional foundations
of negative integration. So far the Court seems to promote
a company law regime that endorses shareholders’ primacy,
lacking, however, the constitutional and institutional legiti-
macy to decide on such a highly political question. It is thus
suggested that a refined test should be adopted that would
capture measures departing from ordinary company law and
hindering market access of foreign investors, while at the
same time allowing Member States to determine their cor-
porate governance systems.
Keywords: Keck, selling arrangements, market access, gold-
en shares, capital
1 Introduction
Twenty-two years have passed since the Court of Justice
of the European Union delivered its seminal judgement
in Keck and Mithouard.1 Things have changed since
then and Europe is no longer the same. The Internal
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tive criticism.
1. Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard, [1993]
ECR I-06097.
Market has evolved to such an extent that it is argued
that we have probably reached the last stage of the
dynamic process of economic integration, which repre-
sents a fully integrated, efficient and competitive Euro-
pean market that can successfully respond to the chal-
lenges posed by the globalised economy of our times.2
Yet, some patterns of the past sometimes come to the
fore to remind us that some questions still remain to be
answered. After a plethora of cases dealing with all sort
of national regulations, we are still trying to figure out
the appropriate test that can provide us with an eco-
nomically sound and legally solid solution to the eternal
conundrum of what qualifies as a ‘trade restriction’.
Also we are still trying to reach a conclusion as to
whether the various tests that the Court has occasionally
applied in one freedom can be equally applicable to the
others. The present article does not purport to have the
answer to this immensely complex and multivariate
challenge. But it does attempt to reflect upon the critical
notion of ‘restriction’ as developed through the case law
of the Court in the field of goods and draw some paral-
lels with the case law in the field of capital. In particular,
it focuses on the golden shares case law and seeks to
investigate whether the doctrine of ‘selling arrange-
ments’ as formulated by the Court in Keck3 together
with the refined ‘market access’ test can be transposed
in the free movement of capital in the form of ‘invest-
ments arrangements’4 that would be excluded from the
scope of Article 63 TFEU. The analysis that follows is
divided into three parts: the first part provides a brief
overview of the case law in the free movement of goods,
depicting the evolution of the scope of measures having
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions (MEEQRs);
the second part turns to the free movement of capital
and attempts to identify three criteria that are used in
order to define the notion of capital restrictions in the
golden shares case law; and finally, the third part seeks
to formulate a Keck-inspired test that could delineate
the contours of capital restrictions and to explore
whether this test could be regarded as a new avenue that
the Court could potentially follow in its legal reasoning
2. E. Spaventa, ‘Leaving Keck Behind? The Free Movement of Goods After
the Rulings in Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson and Roos’, 34 Euro-
pean Law Review 914, at 929 (2009).
3. Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard, at 16.
4. The term was coined by A. Biondi, ‘When the State is the Owner –
Some Further Comments on the Court of Justice “Golden Shares” Strat-
egy’, in U. Bernitz and W. Ringe (eds.), Company Law and Economic
Protectionism: New Challenges to European Integration (2010) 95, at
96-97.
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when dealing with special shareholdings in privatised
companies.
2 Selling Arrangements and
Market Access in the Free
Movement of Goods
2.1 The Pre-Keck Case Law on MEEQRs
The establishment and development of the European
Union’s (EU) Internal Market has been to a large extent
supported and promoted by the dynamics of negative
integration. It was the Luxembourg Court that stepped
in and took the lead in overcoming the political stagna-
tion of the 1960s/1970s and facilitating the process of
economic integration. With the two landmark decisions
in Dassonville5 and Cassis de Dijon,6 the Court unleashed
the powers of negative integration and inaugurated a
new era, where any national rule capable of hindering,
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Com-
munity trade could be regarded as an MEEQR.7 The
principle of mutual recognition was proclaimed as the
predominant criterion for determining whether a trade
restriction existed or not.8 This meant that the princi-
ples of non-discrimination and anti-protectionism were
soon replaced by the strikingly broad and ‘inherently
nebulous’9 concept of market access. The far-reaching
consequences did not take too long to make themselves
felt: in the aftermath of the two rulings, a wave of spec-
ulative national litigation mushroomed, calling for all
sorts of national regulations to be disapplied as contrary
to the free movement provisions.10 Most of the contes-
ted measures were indistinctly applicable regulatory
5. Case 8-74, Dassonville, [1974] ECR 00837.
6. Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon, [1979] ECR 00649.
7. Case 8-74, Dassonville, at 5.
8. C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU (2014), at 656.
9. P. Oliver and S. Enchelmaier, ‘Free Movement of Goods: Recent Devel-
opments in the Case Law’, 44 Common Market Law Review 649, at
674 (2007).
10. J. Snell, ‘The Notion of Market Access: A Concept or a Slogan?’, 47
Common Market Law Review 437, at 447 (2010). See e.g. Case
286/81, Oosthoek’s Uitgeversmaatschappij BV, [1982] ECR-04575
concerning a Dutch rule prohibiting the offering of free gifts for sales
promotion purposes; Case 155/80, Sergius Oebel, [1981] ECR 01993
regarding a German prohibition on night-work in bakeries; Case
C-69/88 H. Krantz GmbH, [1990] ECR I-00583 on a Dutch rule grant-
ing tax authorities the power to seize goods sold on instalment terms
with reservation of title in case the purchasers were not able to repay
their tax debts; Case C-145/88 Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q plc.,
[1989] ECR 03851 on the British prohibition of Sunday trading; Case
C-23/89, Quietlynn Limited and Brian James Richards, [1990] ECR
I-03059 regarding the British legislation prohibiting the sale of lawful
sex articles from unlicensed sex establishments; Case 382/87, R. Buet,
[1989] ECR 01235 concerning a French prohibition on canvassing in
connection with the sale of English-language teaching material; Case
C-271/92, Laboratoire de Prothèses Oculaires, [1993] ECR I-02899
dealing with a provision in the French Code de la Santé Publique reserv-
ing solely to holders of an optician’s certificate (Diplôme d’ opticien-
lunetier) the sale of optical appliances and corrective lenses; Case
C-126/91, Yves Rocher, [1993] ECR I-02361 on a German rule prohib-
iting advertisements using price comparisons (displaying the new price
and comparing it with the old one so as to catch the eye).
requirements that applied without distinction to domes-
tic and foreign goods or traders and did not restrict or
affect inter-State trade. This avalanche of legal actions
against national rules regulating marketing and selling
conditions was perceived as an intrusion into the
domain of national regulatory autonomy, and it was
increasingly suggested that the Court should clarify and
delineate the boundaries of Article 34 TFEU.11 In the
same vein, Advocate General Tesauro in Hünermund
courageously admitted that he had changed his mind in
relation to his views in a previous case law,12 and he
opined that the Dassonville formula could not be con-
strued as meaning that a potential reduction in imports
caused solely and exclusively by a more general (and
hypothetical) contraction of sales could constitute an
MEEQR.13 Accordingly, he asserted that rules that
regulated the manner in which a trading activity was
carried out were in principle to be regarded as falling
outside the scope of Article 34 TFEU, insofar as they
did not intend to regulate trade itself and they were not
liable to render market access less profitable (and thus
indirectly more difficult) for importers.14 He believed
that this approach was in line with the principle of
mutual recognition established in Cassis de Dijon and did
not in any way undermine its truly integrationist inspi-
ration.15 A different (i.e. more intrusive) interpretation
of Article 34 TFEU ‘would ultimately render nugatory
the Treaty provisions … or in any event devalue them’.16
2.2 The Keck Ruling and the Introduction of the
Concept of Selling Arrangements
The Court sooner or later realised that its broad defini-
tion of MEEQR and its blurry and ill-defined market-
access approach had opened a Pandora’s box. Thus, in
1993, when it was called upon to rule on the compatibil-
ity of a French prohibition on resale at a loss, it decided
to put an end to the opportunistic and unsubstantiated
litigation (though arguably in a clumsy manner). It
explicitly expressed its intention to re-examine and clar-
ify its case law in view of the increasing tendency of
traders to invoke Article 34 TFEU as a means of chal-
lenging any rules whose effect was to limit their com-
mercial freedom even where such rules were not aimed
11. E.L. White, ‘In Search of the Limits to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty’, 26
Common Market Law Review 235 (1989); L.W. Gormley, ‘Case
145/88, Torfaen Borough Council v. B&Q PLC (formerly B&Q Retail
Ltd.), Preliminary reference under Art. 177 EEC by the Cwmbran Magis-
trates’ Court on the interpretation of Arts. 30 & 36 EEC. Judgment of
the Court of Justice of the European Communities of 23 November
1989’, 27 Common Market Law Review 141 (1990); A. Arnull, ‘What
Shall We Do on Sunday?’, 16 European Law Review 112 (1991); K.
Mortelmans, ‘Article 30 of the EEC Treaty and Legislation Relating to
Market Circumstances: Time to Consider a New Definition?’, 28 Com-
mon Market Law Review 115 (1991); J. Steiner, ‘Drawing the Line:
Uses and Abuses of Article 30 EEC’, 29 Common Market Law Review
749 (1992).
12. Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Case C-292/92, Ruth Hüner-
mund, [1993] ECR I-06787, para. 26.
13. Ibid., para. 25.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., para. 27.
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at products from other Member States.17 Thus, it intro-
duced the famous (or rather infamous) concept of selling
arrangements: rules that restricted or prohibited certain
selling arrangements were not such as to hinder directly
or indirectly, actually or potentially trade between
Member States as long as two conditions were fulfilled:
(i) they applied to all relevant traders operating within
the national territory; and (ii) they affected in the same
manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic
products and of those from other Member States.18
The exact content of the concept of selling arrange-
ments was revealed in subsequent case law: rules on
shop opening hours,19 rules requiring processed milk for
infants be sold only in pharmacies20 and certain restric-
tive rules on advertising21 are some examples of the type
of national regulatory provisions that were captured by
the concept of selling arrangements and were thus
excluded from the scope of Article 34 TFEU. In general
terms, rules relating to the place and time of sales as well
as to the marketing of specific products were in princi-
ple considered to be caught by the Keck-formula.22
However, the somewhat artificial dichotomy between
product rules and selling arrangements proved inade-
quate and sparked an academic debate.23 Lawrence
Gromley noted that the exclusion of selling arrange-
ments from the scope of Article 34 TFEU would lead to
a lack of judicial review of ostensibly innocent measures,
which could, however, constitute disguised restrictions
on inter-State trade.24 Stephen Weatherill, while recog-
nising that the ruling excluded from the scope of the
Treaty certain regulatory choices that do not damage
17. Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard, at 14.
18. Ibid., at 16.
19. Joined Cases C-401/92 and C-402/92, Boermans, [1994] ECR I-02199;
Joined Cases C-69/93 and C-258/93 Punto Casa and PPV, [1994] ECR
I-02355; Joined Cases C-418/93 et al., Semeraro Casa Uno and Others,
[1996] ECR I-02975; Case C-483/12, Pelckmans, published in the elec-
tronic Reports of Cases.
20. Case C-391/92, Commission v. Greece (processed milk for infants),
[1995] ECR I-01621.
21. Case C-292/92, Ruth Hünermund, [1993] ECR I-06787; Case
C-412/93, Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicité, [1995] ECR I-00179; Joined
Cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95, De Agostini, [1997] ECR
I-3843; Case C-405/98, Gourmet, [2001] ECR I-1795.
22. Case C-71/02, Herbert Karner, [2004] ECR I-03025, at 38.
23. The Keck judgement and its implications for the functioning of the
internal market have been extensively analysed by legal scholars. See
indicatively L. Gormley, ‘Reasoning Renounced? The Remarkable Judg-
ment in Keck & Mithouard?’, 5 European Business Law Review 63
(1994); M.P. Maduro, ‘Keck: The End? The Beginning of the End? Or
Just the End of the Beginning’, 1 Irish Journal of European Law 30
(1994); N. Bernard, ‘Discrimination and Free Movement in E.C. Law’,
45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 82 (1996); C. Bar-
nard, ‘Fitting the Remaining Pieces into the Goods and Persons Jig-
saw?’, 26 European Law Review 35 (2001); A. Tryfonidou, ‘Was Keck a
Half-Baked Solution After All?’, 34 Legal Issues of Economic Integration
167 (2007); I. Lianos, ‘Shifting Narratives in the European Internal Mar-
ket: Efficient Restrictions of Trade and the Nature of “Economic” Inte-
gration’, 21 European Business Law Review 705 (2010); C. Barnard,
‘What the Keck? Balancing the Needs of the Single Market with State
Regulatory Autonomy’, 2 European Journal of Consumer Law 201
(2012); S. Weatherill, ‘The Road to Ruin: “Restrictions on Use” and the
Circular Lifecycle of Article 34 TFEU’, 2 European Journal of Consumer
Law 359 (2012).
24. L.W. Gormley, ‘Two Years After Keck’, 19 Fordhman International Law
Journal 866, at 885-886 (1996).
the realisation of economies of scale, he nevertheless
considered that it had a ‘disturbingly formalistic tone’
and it was ‘flawed by the absence of an adequate articu-
lation of just why it was possible to conclude that no
sufficient impact on trade between States was shown’.25
He thus proposed a refined Keck-test that would allow
Member States to apply national regulatory measures to
imported goods as long as they would apply equally in
law and in fact to domestic and foreign goods and they
would not impose direct or substantial hindrance to mar-
ket access.26
The origin of this refined test can be traced back to the
Advocate General Jacobs’ opinion in Leclerc-Siplec,27
where he expressed his famous objection to the Keck-
inspired presumption of lawfulness of selling arrange-
ments and proposed the adoption of a test based on ‘sub-
stantial hindrance on market access’ for determining
whether non-discriminatory rules infringed Article 34
TFEU.28 The significance of the impact on market
access was also espoused by other Advocates General29
and legal scholars as a criterion for establishing the exis-
tence of an MEEQR.30 It was argued that the case law
offered room for de minimis considerations in free move-
ment law, in the sense that ‘minimal restrictive effects’
did not affect market access, while several trade restric-
tions hindered significantly market access and thus
impinged on Article 34 TFEU.31 However, the position
of the Court was less clear. Although it had ostensibly
rejected the adoption of a de minimis test in the free
movement assessment,32 it effectively accepted a similar
test by acknowledging that if the effect on market
25. S. Weatherill, ‘After Keck: Some Thoughts on How to Clarify the Clarifi-
cation’, 33 Common Market Law Review 885, at 887 (1996).
26. Ibid., at 903.
27. Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-412/93 Leclerc-
Siplec, [1995] ECR I-00179.
28. Ibid., para. 39.
29. Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl in Case C-322/01, DocMorris
NV, [2003] ECR I-14887, para. 78, where he underlined that ‘The deci-
sive factor should therefore be whether or not a national measure sig-
nificantly impedes access to the market’. See also Opinion of Mr.
Advocate General Van Gerven in Case C-145/88, Torfaen, [1989]
ECR-03851, para. 24, where he argued that there was no room for a de
minimis test, because Article 34 TFEU already presupposes a serious,
and therefore a more than appreciable, obstruction to trade between
Member States.
30. M.S. Jansson and H. Kalimo, ‘De Minimis Meets “Market Access”:
Transformations in the Substance – and the Syntax – of EU Free Move-
ment Law?’, 51 Common Market Law Review 523 (2014). It is interest-
ing to note that the authors of this article distinguish three substantive
groups of de minimis thresholds: the magnitude (severity) of the restric-
tive effect, the probability of the restrictive effect and the causality
between the measure and the restrictive effect. See also Steiner, above
n. 11; Barnard (2014), above n. 8, at 147; H. Toner, ‘Non-discriminato-
ry Obstacles to the Exercise of Treaty Rights – Articles 39, 43, 49, and
18 EC’, 23 Yearbook of European Law 275, at 285 (2004). Conversely,
c.f. Weatherill (1996), above n. 25, who refrains from describing the
‘direct or substantial hindrance to market access’ test as a de minimis
threshold.
31. Jansson and Kalimo, above n. 30, at 526.
32. Joined Cases 177 and 178/82, Jan van de Haar, [1984] ECR-01797, at
13; Case C-67/97, Ditlev Bluhme, [1998] ECR I-08033, at 20; Joined
Cases C-1/90 and C-176/90, Aragonesa de Publicidad and Publivía v.
Departamento de Sanidad, [1991] ECR I-4151, at 24; Joined Cases
C-277/91, C-318/91 and C-319/91 Ligur Carni and Others, [1993]
ECR I-6621, at 37.
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access was ‘too uncertain or indirect’33 or ‘purely hypo-
thetical’,34 then the contested measure did not infringe
free movement provisions.
2.3 The Post-Keck Market Access Test
The Court started widening the scope of Article 34
TFEU by restricting the scope of selling arrangements
and gradually adopted an over-inclusive ‘market access’
test.35 In particular, in subsequent case law, the Court
interpreted the two conditions contained in paragraph
16 of Keck as meaning that certain selling arrangements
could not escape the scrutiny of the free movement pro-
visions if they were discriminatory or they imposed
additional burdens on imported goods (in the sense of
the ‘dual burdens’ that the principle of mutual recogni-
tion was intended to eliminate under the Cassis de Dijon
judgement). Cases such as Familiarpress,36De Agosti-
ni,37Gourmet38 and Alfa Vita39 signalled the transition
from an approach based on a formalistic distinction
between ‘product rules’ and ‘selling arrangements’ to a
more straightforward test based on ‘market access hin-
drance’.40 Progressively, the Court departed from the
Keck-test, without, however, overruling it explicitly. In
Commission v. Italy (trailers)41 and Mickelsson and
Roos,42 the Court reintroduced a refined market access
test according to which rules restricting the use of prod-
33. Case C-69/88, H. Krantz GmbH, [1990] ECR I-00583, at 11; Case
C-190/98, Volker Graf, [2000] ECR I-00493, at 25 (in the field of free
movement for workers). Conversely, in Case C-415/93, Bosman,
[1995] ECR I-04921, at 103, the Court found that the transfer rules at
issue directly affected players’ access to the employment market in oth-
er Member States and were thus capable of impeding the freedom of
movement for workers. Similarly, in Case C-384/93, Alpine Invest-
ments, [1995] ECR I-01141, the Court ruled that the prohibition of cold
calling by telephone for financial services directly affected access to the
market in services in the other Member States and was thus capable of
hindering intra-Community trade in services.
34. Case C-299/95, Friedrich Kremzow v. Republik Österreich, [1997] ECR
I-02629, at 16, where the Court interestingly ruled that whilst any dep-
rivation of liberty may impede a person from exercising his or her right
to free movement, a purely hypothetical prospect of exercising that
right does not establish a sufficient connection with Community law to
justify the application of free movement provisions.
35. This over-inclusive market access test has been criticised by some schol-
ars. See e.g. Catherine Barnard notes that the intrusion into national
regulatory autonomy can have profound repercussions for national leg-
islation adopted by democratic governments, as almost every national
regulatory requirement can in one way or another affect the economic
freedom of market operators, even if that was never the intention of
the legislator and the effect on trade is inappreciable. See Barnard
(2014), above n. 8, at 20.
36. Case C-368/95, Familiapress, [1997] ECR I-03689.
37. Joined Cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95, De Agostini.
38. Case C-405/98, Gourmet.
39. Joined Cases C-158/04 and C-159/04, Alfa Vita, [2006] ECR I-08135,
at 19.
40. For the notion of the market access, see Snell (2010), above n. 9; G.
Davies, ‘Understanding Market Access: Exploring the Economic Ration-
ality of Different Conceptions of Free Movement Law’, 11 German Law
Journal 671 (2010); C. Barnard, ‘Restricting Restrictions: Lessons for the
EU from the US?’, 68 Cambridge Law Journal 575 (2009); E. Spaventa,
‘From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (Non)-Economic European
Constitution’, 41 Common Market Law Review 743 (2004); Case
C-531/07, Fachverband der Buch- und Medienwirtschaft v. LIBRO
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, [2009] ECR I-03717.
41. Case C-110/05, Commission v. Italy (trailers), [2009] ECR I-00519.
42. Case C-142/05, Mickelsson and Roos, [2009] ECR I-04273.
ucts hinder the market access of foreign products and
therefore constitute MEEQR prohibited under Article
34 TFEU.43
In the same vein, in LIBRO,44 the Court ruled that book
price-fixing45 of German language books in Austria con-
stituted an MEEQR contrary to Article 34 TFEU,46 as
it could potentially hinder market access for German
book importers.47 Furthermore, the predominance of
the ‘market access’ test was very recently reiterated in
the Scotch Whisky case,48 where Court held that the
Scottish imposition of a minimum price per unit of alco-
hol prevented the lower cost price of imported products
being reflected in the selling price to the consumer and
was thus capable of hindering the access to the UK mar-
ket of alcoholic drinks that were lawfully marketed in
other Member States.49
However, this ‘market access’ test is sometimes quali-
fied by an additional step, which requires that the meas-
ure at issue have a direct/substantial/significant effect on
inter-State trade. Thus, in Ker-Optika, the Hungarian
prohibition on the selling of contact lenses via the Inter-
net was deemed to be an MEEQR within the meaning of
Article 34 TFEU, because it deprived traders from oth-
er Member States of a particularly effective means of
selling those products and therefore significantly impe-
ded market access.50 Although admittedly the Court is
not very consistent in the terminology or the precise
tests that it uses, the fact nonetheless remains that its
analysis implicitly includes a quantitative element: only
measures that directly/substantially/significantly affect
43. For an academic discussion, see for instance L. Prete, ‘Of Motorcycle
Trailers and Personal Watercrafts: The Battle over Keck’, 35 Legal Issues
of Economic Integration 133 (2008); P. Pecho, ‘Good-Bye Keck?: A
Comment on the Remarkable Judgment in Commission v. Italy,
C-110/05’, 36 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 257 (2009); P.
Wenneras and K.B. Moen, ‘Selling Arrangements, Keeping Keck’, 35
European Law Review 387 (2010); P. Oliver, ‘Of Trailers and Jet Skis: Is
the Case Law on Article 34 TFEU Hurtling in a New Direction?’, 33
Fordhman International Law Journal 1423 (2011); G. Davies, ‘The
Court’s Jurisprudence on Free Movement of Goods: Pragmatic Pre-
sumptions, Not Philosophical Principles’, 2 European Journal of Con-
sumer Law 25 (2012).
44. Case C-531/07, Fachverband der Buch- und Medienwirtschaft v.
LIBRO Handelsgesellschaft mbH, [2009] ECR I-03717.
45. Specifically, the case concerned an Austrian law prohibiting Austrian
importers of German-language books from fixing a retail price below
that fixed or recommended by the publisher for the State of publication.
46. Case C-531/07, Fachverband der Buch- und Medienwirtschaft, at
21-22.
47. Ibid.
48. Case C-333/14, The Scotch Whisky Association and Others, [2015]
n.y.p.
49. Ibid., at 32.
50. Case C-108/09, Ker-Optika, [2010] ECR I-12213, at 54. By the same
token but in a different context, recently the Court found that the
Spanish legislation prohibiting tobacco retailers from importing tobacco
products and forcing them to procure their supplies from authorised
wholesalers hindered the access of these products to the market. This
was despite the contentions of the Commission and the Spanish Gov-
ernment that the legislation at issue had to be assessed in the light of
Art. 37 TFEU, because it concerned the operation of a monopoly of a
commercial character and the restrictions on trade that are inherent in
the existence of such a monopoly. See Case C-456/10 Asociación
Nacional de Expendedores de Tabaco y Timbre (ANETT) v. Administra-
ción del Estado [2012], published in the electronic reports of cases, at
21, 43.
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inter-State trade are captured by the MEEQR defini-
tion. By contrast, measures with hypothetical, remote,
uncertain or indirect effect on market access escape from
the internal market scrutiny.51
3 Defining Capital Restrictions
in the Golden Shares Case
Law
3.1 Golden Shares in Europe
In the early 2000s, after almost a decade from the Keck
judgement, the Court was faced with the question
whether the doctrine of selling arrangements could be
applied in the field of the free movement of capital and,
more precisely, in the golden shares case law. This case
law raises important legal, political and economic ques-
tions, as it addresses issues, which lie at the heart of the
fundamental interplay between the State and the Mar-
ket.
The origins of golden shares can be traced back to the
post-war economic history of Europe. In the aftermath
of the Second World War, a widespread public owner-
ship thrived in Europe in an effort to resuscitate the
war-ravaged economies, boost growth and create nation-
al champions in strategic industries, which were deemed
essential for national economy. The two privatisation
waves that followed (the first in the late 1970s and 1980s
as a result of the policy pursued by Margaret Thatcher
in the UK and the second in the 1990s because of budg-
etary constraints imposed by the Maastricht Treaty and
the subsequent efforts of Member States to reduce their
public debts) did not thwart state intervention in the
market.52 One way of retaining control over the previ-
ously state-owned and subsequently privatised compa-
nies was through the creation of golden shares.
The notion of golden shares refers to the special rights
that Member States usually maintain in strategically
sensitive privatised companies (telecommunications,
energy, postal services, car industries, etc.).53 These
special rights grant to the State the right to control
changes in ownership and/or veto certain strategic deci-
sions in order to prevent hostile takeovers, guarantee the
51. It could be argued that the ‘substantial effect’ test refers to a certain
threshold that needs to be met in order for a measure to constitute an
MEEQR, whereas the ‘remote effect’ test seeks to establish a link of
causality between the contested measure and restriction on inter-State
trade. Be that as it may, this distinction is not unproblematic, that is
why some authors see a convergence of the two tests. See in particular
Barnard (2014), above n. 8, at 147; Weatherill (1996), above n. 25, at
900; D. Doukas, ‘Untying the Market Access Knot: Advertising Restric-
tions and the Free Movement of Goods and Services’, 9 Cambridge
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 177 (2007).
52. S. Grundmann and F. Möslein, ‘The Golden Share – State Control in Pri-
vatised Companies: Comparative Law, European Law and Policy
Aspects’, Euredia 623, at 633 (2001-2002).
53. Oxera, ‘Special Rights of Public Authorities in Privatised EU Companies:
The Microeconomic Impact’, Report Prepared for the European Com-
mission (2005), at 3, available at: <http:// ec. europa. eu/ internal_
market/ capital/ docs/ 2005_ 10_ special_ rights_ full_ report_ en. pdf>.
provision of services of general interest, and safeguard
public security and other public interest objectives.54
The use of golden shares became a widespread phenom-
enon in Europe in the 1990s and 2000s. The Commis-
sion was not particularly content with these develop-
ments and regarded the establishment of special hold-
ings in national champions as an expression of economic
patriotism.55 Fearing that this trend could severely
obstruct the functioning of the Internal Market, it initi-
ated a number of infringement proceedings against the
Member States that had maintained special rights in
privatised companies.
The conclusion that can be drawn after more than twen-
ty years of litigation56 is that golden shares constitute a
restriction on the free movement of capital because of
their dissuasive effect on investment. However, they may
be justified by legitimate objectives in the public interest
if the State provides sufficient evidence that the meas-
ures at issue comply with a strict proportionality test
and requirements of legal certainty.57 Therefore, just
like in the other freedoms, the Court is confronted with
the challenge of striking a fair balance between econom-
ic freedom (here in the form of foreign direct or portfo-
lio investments in privatised companies) and the Mem-
ber State’s need to protect the overriding reasons in the
public interest. Only here, the implications of its rulings
54. Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Special Rights in Privatized
Companies in the Enlarged Union – A Decade Full of Developments’
(2005), at 4, available at: <http:// ec. europa. eu/ internal_ market/ capital/
docs/ privcompanies_ en. pdf>.
55. See in particular the highly cited Communication of the Commission on
certain legal aspects concerning intra-EU investment, OJ C 220 of 19
July 1997, at 15-18. The concept of ‘economic patriotism’ or ‘economic
protectionism’ implies the ‘assertion of selfish interests in defiance of
market forces, by those in a position to influence the outcome to that
end by legal means’, see J. Rickford, ‘Protectionism, Capital Freedom
and the Internal Market’, in U. Bernitz and W. Ringe (eds.), Company
Law and Economic Protectionism: New Challenges to European Inte-
gration (2010) 54, at 55; J. Rickford, ‘Free Movement of Capital and
Protectionism After Volkswagen and Viking Line’, in M. Tison, H. De
Wulf, C. Van der Elst & R. Steennot (eds.), Perspectives in Company
Law and Financial Regulation – Essays in Honour of Eddy Wymeersch
(2009) 61, at 62.
56. Case C-58/99, Commission v. Italy, [2000] ECR I-03811; Case
C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, [2002] ECR I-04731; Case
C-483/99, Commission v. France, [2002] ECR I-04781; Case
C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, [2002] ECR I-04809; Case
C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, [2003] ECR I-04581; Case C-98/01,
Commission v. United Kingdom, [2003] ECR I-04641; C-174/04, Com-
mission v. Italy, [2005] ECR I-04933; Joined Cases C-282/04 and
C-283/04, Commission v. The Netherlands, [2006] ECR I-09141; Case
C-112/05, Commission v. Germany, [2007] ECR I-08995; Joined Cases
C-463/04 and C-464/04, Federconsumatori and Others and Associa-
zione Azionariato Diffuso dell’AEM SpA and Others v Comune di Mila-
no, [2007] ECR I-10419; C-274/06, Commission v. Spain, [2008] ECR
I-00026; C-207/07, Commission v. Spain, [2008] ECR I-00111; Case
C-326/07, Commission v. Italy, [2009] ECR I-02291; Case C-171/08,
Commission v. Portugal, [2010] ECR I-06817; Case C-543/08, Com-
mission v. Portugal, [2010] ECR I-11241; Case C-212/09, Commission
v. Portugal, [2011] ECR I-10889; Case C-244/11, Commission v.
Greece, [2012], published in the electronic reports of cases; Case
C-95/12, Commission v. Germany, [2013], published in the electronic
reports of cases.
57. So far only on one occasion did the Court find that the contested spe-
cial rights were justified by public interest requirements and were also
consistent with the principles of proportionality and legal certainty, and
that was in Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium.
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are far more profound, as they can affect the national
corporate governance systems and the varieties of capi-
talism that exist in Europe.58
3.2 Selling Arrangements in Golden Shares Case
Law
Not surprisingly, the Member States have consistently
expressed their strong opposition to this line of case law,
arguing that it essentially deprives them of their right to
choose the corporate governance regime that suits best
to the structure of their economy and corresponds to the
needs of their industrial policy. Among their various
defences, some Member States attempted to draw a par-
allel between golden shares and selling arrangements,
arguing that a Keck-like approach should apply in rela-
tion to the special shareholding retained in privatised
companies.59 However, they did not manage to convince
the Court to moderate its rigid legal reasoning in order
to prevent a replication of the legal ramifications of the
over-extensive application of the free movement rules,
as the one occurred in the aftermath of Dassonville and
Cassis de Dijon.
It emerges from the case law that the Court has not for-
mulated a clear and consistent test as to what constitutes
a capital restriction. Nevertheless, we can identify cer-
tain criteria which – if combined – could result in a
structured legal test for capital restrictions. These crite-
ria are the following: (1) discrimination on grounds of
nationality, (2) derogation from ordinary company law
and (3) positive effect on capital flows. The first criteri-
on has appeared only once in the golden shares case
law,60 and because of its straightforward discriminatory
nature, it is undisputed that it constitutes a restriction
on the free movement of capital, which can only be jus-
tified by the objectives provided for under the
58. Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) is a theory from the field of political econ-
omy, which essentially distinguishes between coordinated and liberal
market economies on account of the corporate governance regime and
the methods of production in these economies. It was introduced in
2001 by the influential work of P.A. Hall and D. Soskice, ‘An Introduc-
tion to Varieties of Capitalism’, in P.A. Hall and D. Soskice (eds.), Vari-
eties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative
Advantage (2001). Following this development, literature in this field
has been gradually flourishing, revealing the importance of VoC in
European Integration Theory. See indicatively J. Snell, ‘Varieties of Capi-
talism and the Limits of European Economic Integration’, 13 Cambridge
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 415 (2012); P. Zumbansen and D.
Saam, ‘The ECJ, Volkswagen and European Corporate Law: Reshaping
the European Varieties of Capitalism’, 8 German Law Journal 1027
(2007); D. Kinderman, ‘Challenging Varieties of Capitalism’s Account of
Business Interests: The New Social Market Initiative and German
Employers’ Quest for Liberalization, 2000-2014’, Discussion Paper No.
14/16 (2014).
59. Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain; C-98/01, Commission v. UK;
C-171/08, Commission v. Portugal; C-543/08, Commission v. Portu-
gal; C-219/09, Commission v. Portugal. Although the present article
focuses primarily on the five aforementioned cases, it should be noted
that the arguments are drawn from the entire golden shares case law,
with the seminal VW case being one of the leading examples (Case
C-112/05, Commission v. Germany, [2007] ECR I-08995).
60. Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, [2002] ECR I-04731. The case
concerned, amongst others, a prohibition precluding investors from oth-
er Member States from acquiring more than a given number of shares
in certain Portuguese undertakings. This was of course a discriminatory
restriction on the free movement of capital.
Treaties.61 Therefore, it will not be further analysed, as
there is a wide consensus as to its restrictive nature. The
second criterion, namely derogation from ordinary com-
pany law, has been developed in the context of golden
shares, and it constitutes the foundation for the con-
struction and development of a Keck-inspired approach
in the free movement of capital. This approach raises
interesting and contentious legal questions, which will
be addressed in Section 3.2.1. Finally, the positive effect
on capital flows criterion, inspired by the ‘substantial
hindrance’ test originating from the free movement of
goods, could perhaps contribute to the formulation of a
more prudent test for capital restrictions in the golden
shares case law. Its possible implications will be
addressed in Section 3.2.2.
3.2.1 The ‘Derogation from Ordinary Company Law’
Criterion
The ‘derogation from ordinary company law’ criterion
was introduced in the golden shares case law in order to
determine, first, whether a special shareholding qualifies
as a State measure and, second, whether it has a restric-
tive effect on capital movements. In reality, these two
steps form part of one and the same test: if the State acts
in its capacity as public authority and introduces special
rights in a privatised company in derogation from ordi-
nary company law in order to avail itself of a privileged
position to the exclusion of private individuals, it
restricts the free movement of capital; if, on the other
hand, it acts in its capacity as a shareholder of a priva-
tised company through a private act62 in accordance
with national company law, the special shareholding at
issue constitutes an ‘investment arrangement’ that does
not restrict the free movement of capital.
So far, most of the cases concerned golden shares intro-
duced in derogation from the national company law in
force at the time. Thus, the conclusion of the Court
was, in most cases, justified by the need to prevent the
State from exercising its regulatory powers in order to
arbitrarily benefit from special prerogatives in the man-
agement of privatised companies. However, it is one
thing to maintain a level-playing field between the State
and private shareholders, and it is another to impose on
all Member States a certain model of corporate gover-
nance that adheres to a strict principle of proportionality
between ownership and control63 and does not allow
61. Although the Case C-367/98 Commission v. Portugal concerned a
directly discriminatory measure, it should be noted that indirectly dis-
criminatory measures are also covered by this criterion (one could for
example envisage a situation where the national measure entails dis-
crimination on the basis of the residence of the shareholders or the
Members of the Board of Directors).
62. Usually through an amendment of the articles of association.
63. The principle of proportionality between ownership and control implies
that any shareholder should own the same fraction of cash flow rights
and voting rights. The OECD notes that proportionality as an economic
welfare enhancing proposition is not self-evident. In fact, proportionali-
ty-limiting mechanisms are available in most countries, and they may
actually be efficiency enhancing because they help overcome agency
and incentive problems. See in particular OECD, ‘Lack of Proportionality
between Ownership and Control: Overview and Issues for Discussion’
(2007), available at: <www. oecd. org/ daf/ ca/ 40038351. pdf>.
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room for control-enhancing mechanisms (CEMs).64
The analysis that follows attempts to shed light into this
delicate distinction by examining some of the Court’s
golden shares rulings.
3.2.1.1 The British Airports Authority Case
One of the cases that can be used as a paradigm of a rig-
orous and over-inclusive interpretation of Article 63
TFEU is the Commission v. UK (BBA) case.65 British
Airports Authority (BAA), Britain’s biggest airport
operator, was privatised in 1986 as part of the privatisa-
tion policy pursued by Margaret Thatcher. The privati-
sation process was governed by the Airports Act 1986.
The UK Government retained control over the newly
formed company that took over the functions of the pre-
viously state-owned enterprise by retaining a special
shareholding. In particular, the Articles of Association
of the privatised BAA provided for a rule that prevented
the acquisition of more than 15% of the voting shares in
the company. Furthermore, they introduced a proce-
dure that empowered the UK Government to give con-
sent to certain major operations of the company, such as
disposal of assets, control of subsidiaries and winding-
up.
The UK Government argued first that national compa-
ny law allowed the existence of different classes of
shares as well as the existence of differences in the rights
attached to them in relation to sharing the company’s
profits and to its management.66 Secondly, BAA’s Arti-
cles of Association could not be equated to national leg-
islation (and thus regarded as a State measure), as their
adoption was a mere application of private law mecha-
nisms allowed under ordinary company law.
64. CEMs are various instruments that allow for the separation of owner-
ship from control in listed companies, such as multiple voting rights
shares, non-voting shares, pyramid structures, voting right ceilings,
ownership ceilings and supermajority provisions. A study that was con-
ducted by ISS Europe, Shearman and Sterling and the European Corpo-
rate Governance Institute in 2007 at the request of the European Com-
mission showed that CEMs are relatively common across the EU. Of all
the 464 European companies considered, 44% have one or more cor-
porate CEMs (or other alternative mechanism). The countries with the
highest proportion of companies featuring at least one of these mecha-
nisms are France, Sweden, Spain, Hungary and Belgium. See Report on
the Proportionality Principle in the European Union, External study com-
missioned by the European Commission (2007), available at: <http:// ec.
europa. eu/ internal_ market/ company/ docs/ shareholders/ study/ final_
report_ en. pdf>; See also Commission of the European Communities,
‘Impact Assessment on the Proportionality between Capital and Control
in Listed Companies’, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2007)
1705, at 4, available at: <http:// ec. europa. eu/ internal_ market/
company/ docs/ shareholders/ impact_ assessment_ 122007. pdf>. The lat-
ter document presents the pros and cons of possible policy actions, also
including an evaluation of the consequences of not undertaking any
regulatory action in this field. The impact assessment was validated by
the Commission’s impact assessment board. After weighing the argu-
ments advanced, Commissioner McCreevy decided that there was no
need for an action at EU level on this issue. Therefore, DG Internal Mar-
ket and Services terminated their work in this area. This should be
regarded as an indication that the political institutions of the Union
have decided to maintain their neutrality with respect to the principle of
proportionality and pay homage to the Member State’s right to organ-
ise their corporate governance regimes.
65. Case C-98/01, Commission v. UK.
66. Ibid., at 26.
These arguments were not accepted by the Court. It
held that the fact that BAA’s Articles of Association
were to be approved (and were actually) by the Secreta-
ry of State pursuant to the Airports Act 1986 meant that
the UK had acted in its capacity as a public authority
and not as a shareholder, and therefore the restrictions
had not arisen from a normal operation of company
law.67 However, one might wonder whether the appro-
val by the Secretary of State was a sufficient condition
for a private law act – adopted in compliance with
national company law – to be regarded as a State meas-
ure. Surely, it cannot be denied that there was an appro-
val by the Secretary of State, but this cannot alter the
nature of the Articles of Association as a private agree-
ment among the shareholders. The State did not use its
public authority powers in order to derogate from ordi-
nary company law and benefit arbitrarily from a privi-
leged status by distorting the market; rather it acted as a
shareholder and made use of the possibilities offered by
ordinary company law, just like any private investor
could have done in a similar situation.
Secondly, the ordinary law criterion was used as a basis
to advance the argument that the contested special
rights should be interpreted in the light of the Keck rul-
ing. The UK Government reminded the Court of its
own efforts to keep a tight rein on the speculative litiga-
tion that emerged in the field of goods after Dassonville
and Cassis de Dijon by adopting a more moderate
approach in Keck. The application of a Keck-informed
test would entail the exclusion of the contested special
rights from the scope of capital restrictions under Arti-
cle 63 TFEU.
In particular, it was argued that the measures at issue
were applied equally to foreign and domestic investors
and they did not restrict market access. Rules of private
law such as the ones in the BAA’s Articles of Associa-
tion, which did not derogate from normal company law
and merely determined the characteristics of the special
shareholding, could not possibly amount to a restriction
on market access.68 It was further contended that the
Member States were entitled to engage in economic
activities on the same basis as private market operators,
within the framework of contracts governed by private
law. As there was no secondary legislation on this mat-
ter, EU law could not impose on a company the obliga-
tion to be placed under market control or to attach to its
shares the rights that all actual or potential investors
might wish to see attached to them.69 If the special
shareholding were open to challenge, this would mean
that holders of ordinary shares could rely on the Treaty
in order to renegotiate the rights attached to the shares
they had bought.70 In other words, ordinary sharehold-
ers would be allowed to convert their ordinary shares
into special shares. This interpretation, however, could
not be accepted, as EU law could not impose a specific
67. Ibid., at 48.
68. Ibid., at 29.
69. Ibid., at 31.
70. Ibid., at 35.
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model of corporate governance. This was – and still
remains – a domain reserved for the national legislator.
However, the Court found that while the contested
measures were not discriminatory, they nonetheless
affected the position of a person acquiring a sharehold-
ing as such and were thus liable to deter investors from
other Member States from making such investments
and consequently affected their access to the market.
Although, in principle, it did not exclude the possibility
of developing a concept similar to that of selling
arrangements in the area of free movement of capital, it
nevertheless rejected it on the facts, by stating that the
measures at issue were not comparable to the rules con-
cerning selling arrangements.71
It could be argued that the outcome of this case might
have been different were it not for the approval of the
Articles of Association by the Secretary of State. This
approval was the decisive factor that led the Court to
rule that the golden shares at issue were at variance with
national company law and could not be regarded as
‘investment arrangements’. Nevertheless, the Court did
not explain how the approval by the Secretary of State
altered the fact that the introduction of special share-
holding was permitted under national company law.
This criterion is decisive of determining whether a
measure constitutes a restriction on capital movements.
The UK Government argued emphatically that national
company law did not preclude special shareholding. It
was in fact so convinced of the merit of its arguments
that it did not advance any justification arguments. This
proved fatal for the outcome of the case, as the Court
did not even examine whether the restriction could be
justified by overriding reasons in the public interest.
3.2.1.2 The Portugal Telecom and GALP Energia
Cases
Contrary to the BAA case, in Commission v. Portugal
(Portugal Telecom SGPS SA),72 the Court rightfully
found that the contested special shareholding amounted
to a State measure liable to restrict the free movement of
capital. The special rights at issue included, among oth-
ers, a right to elect at least one-third of the total number
of directors, including the chairman of the board of
directors, a right to elect one or two of the members of
the executive committee and an approval procedure for
important decisions, such as the appropriation of net
income of the year, alterations to the articles of associa-
tion and increases in share capital, and relocation of its
registered office. Although the preferred shares were
introduced in the Articles of Association, the Court
noted that these Articles were adopted not only immedi-
ately after the adoption of the decree-law authorising
the creation of golden shares within Portugal Telecom,
but in particular at a time when the Portuguese Repub-
lic had a majority holding in the company’s share capital
71. Case C-98/01, Commission v. UK, at 45-48.
72. Case C-171/08, Commission v. Portugal.
and thus exercised control over that company.73 Fur-
thermore, as underlined by Advocate General Mengoz-
zi, the creation of those golden shares was not the result
of a normal application of company law: in derogation
from the Portuguese Commercial Companies Code, the
golden shares retained in Portugal Telecom were not
transferable.74 Therefore, in those circumstances, the
Court rightfully regarded the introduction of golden
shares in Portugal Telecom as a State measure liable to
restrict the free movement of capital. It was clear that
the Portuguese Government had departed from the
ordinary provisions of company law in order to avail
itself of a privileged position in the privatised telecom-
munications company.
Similarly, in Commission v. Portugal (GALP Energia
SGPS SA),75 the Court held that the right of the State
to appoint the chairman of the Board of Directors in
GALP Energia SGPS SA was not stemming from a
normal application of company law, since the Portu-
guese Commercial Companies Code expressly preclu-
ded the right to appoint certain directors being attached
to certain categories of shares.76 The national law at
issue and GALP’s Articles of Association derogated
from general company law with the sole intention of
benefitting the public authorities.77 Consequently, the
right of the State to appoint the chairman of GALP’s
Board of Directors was attributable to the Portuguese
State and was thus falling within the scope of Article 63
TFEU.78
3.2.2 The ‘Positive Effect on Capital Movements’
Criterion
The test that has been developed so far is essentially
based on the derogation from ordinary company law cri-
terion, which could allow us to distinguish between
investment arrangements and restrictions on capital
movements. Although this test could be regarded as suf-
ficient for determining whether the contested golden
shares constitute a restriction on the free movement of
capital, it is suggested that a quantitative dimension
could be added in order to enable the Court to take into
account some factual evidence in borderline and excep-
tional cases in which there is a strong likelihood that the
special shareholding has actually promoted and encour-
aged cross-border capital flows.
73. Ibid., at 53. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is disputed whether
the fact that a State makes use of its majority shareholding in order to
introduce special rights in the Articles of Association – when this is
allowed by national company law – is sufficient to qualify this act as a
‘State measure’. Special rights are usually introduced by those in con-
trol, either in the initial phase of incorporation or after an amendment
of the Articles in view of a planned divestiture. See C. Gerner-Beuerle,
‘Shareholders between the Market and the State. The VW law and
Other Interventions in the Market Economy’, 49 Common Market Law
Review 97 (2012), at 118.
74. Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Case C-171/08 Commission
v. Portugal, para. 62.
75. Case C-212/09, Commission v. Portugal.
76. Ibid., at 5.
77. Ibid., at 53.
78. Ibid., at 54.
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So far the Court has found that special shareholding in
privatised companies amounts to a restriction on capital
movements, even when there is factual evidence that
this shareholding has no negative impact on the acquisi-
tion of shares in the undertaking concerned by foreign
investors. Member States have tried to invoke the ‘sub-
stantial hindrance’ criterion, as developed in the free
movement of goods, in the area of free movement of
capital, but the Court has resisted the pressure.
In particular, in Commission v. Portugal (Energias de Por-
tugal),79 the Portuguese Republic contended that the
provisions of national law at issue did not establish any
direct or substantial obstacle to the access of direct
investors or portfolio investors to the share capital of
EDP. To the contrary, EDP’s shares were among the
most sought-after on the Lisbon Stock Exchange and a
large number of those shares were in the hands of for-
eign investors.80 This could probably be explained by
the fact that the existence of public ownership in a
national industry can be regarded as guaranteeing the
financial stability and solvency of a company, and can
thus act as an incentive for foreign public and private
investors to buy shares in that company. However, the
Court refused to engage in a factual examination of the
actual impact of the special rights in question on cross-
border investment and ruled that foreign investors,
whether actual or potential, might have been deterred
from acquiring stake in the capital of EDP.81
The rationale underlying the substantial hindrance cri-
terion, as developed in the free movement of goods,
could be transposed into the area of free movement of
capital in order to give Member States the possibility to
refute the premise of the Court’s reasoning that golden
shares are by definition a restriction on capital move-
ments. This could take the form of a criterion based on a
possible ‘positive impact’ of golden shares on capital
movements, which would allow the Member States to
prove that despite their prima facie-restrictive nature,
the contested golden shares have actually incentivised
cross-border investment and has increased the number
of foreign shareholders.
In other words, when the contested special rights dero-
gate from ordinary company law, there is a presumption
of a restrictive effect on capital movements. However,
this presumption is rebuttable: the Member State
should be able to provide evidence to prove that the spe-
cial rights at issue not only have not discouraged foreign
investors but have actually had a positive effect on capi-
tal flows. Admittedly, one could argue that this criterion
79. Case C-543/08, Commission v. Portugal. The national legislation at
issue granted to the Portuguese State and to other public shareholders
‘golden shares’ in the company EDP – Energias de Portugal, the princi-
pal licensed distributor of electricity in Portugal and the undertaking
acting as the last resort supplier. The special rights at stake included (a)
the right of veto in respect of certain resolutions of the general meeting
of the company’s shareholders; (b) the right to appoint a director,
where the State has voted against the nominees successfully elected as
directors; and (c) the exemption of the State from the voting ceiling of
5% laid down in relation to the casting of votes.
80. Ibid., at 69.
81. Ibid., at 71.
is loosely framed and it is difficult to be reconciled with
the principle of legal certainty. Nevertheless, if used
carefully and on a case-by-case basis, it could help
redress some shortcomings arising from the erroneous
premise that all golden shares inherently restrict capital
movements.
4 In Search of a Refined Test
for Capital Restrictions
The role of EU law in the formation of the national
regimes of corporate governance lies at the heart of the
underlying rationale of the Court’s approach in the
golden shares case law. The Court embraces the princi-
ple of proportionality between corporate ownership and
control, implying that any shareholder should in princi-
ple own the same fraction of cash flow rights and voting
rights. Its legal reasoning starts from the premise that
the principle of proportionality between ownership and
control should be respected, and thus any structure or
mechanism that derogates from this principle should be
disapplied as it discourages investors from acquiring
shares in the undertaking concerned. According to this
reasoning, the State’s interference in the management of
the company through the vehicle of golden shares is
capable of depressing the value of the shares, thus
reducing the attractiveness of an investment in that
company.82 The reason is that the State might exercise
its special rights in order to protect the public interest,
‘which might be contrary to the economic interests of
the company’.83
The Court seems to embrace the shareholders’ primacy
value as a normative foundation of free capital flows in
the Internal Market. State participation in preferred
holding is regarded as a deterrent for foreign investors,
thus restricting the free movement of capital. This view
reflects an inherently political choice favouring unfet-
82. Case C-171/08, Commission v. Portugal (I), at 54.
83. Joined Cases C-282/04 and C-283/04, Commission v. The Nether-
lands, at 30. A similar view was expressed by Advocate General
Maduro in Federconsumatori, where he opined that public ownership of
shareholding does not reduce the attractiveness of investing in the com-
pany concerned, only insofar as the State respects the normal rules of
operation of the market with a view to maximising its return on invest-
ment. See Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Joined Cases
C-463/04 and C-464/04, Federconsumatori and Others, paras. 25-26.
In this case, for the first time, a shareholders’ association successfully
challenged the golden shares maintained by the Italian Government in
the company Azienda Elettrica Milanese SpA active in the gas and elec-
tricity sector.
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tered liberal market economy,84 as opposed to a market
economy that allows the existence of corporate gover-
nance regimes with CEMs. It also reflects a policy
approach advancing the maximisation of the sharehold-
ers’ profits as the ultimate objective of a corporation.
However, this approach is based on three premises,
whose acceptance is far from evident: it implies that,
first, the interests of the company are those of the share-
holders, secondly, the shareholders’ interests are
embodied in the share value85 and, thirdly, the existence
of golden shares diminishes the share value.86 The
Court endorses the corporate governance school of
thought that advocates shareholders’ primacy as the
ultimate objective of company law and seems to disre-
gard the interests of other stakeholders such as employ-
ees, suppliers, creditors and ultimately the society as a
whole.87
To accept that the mere existence of golden shares
restricts the free movement of capital would imply that
84. The structural bias of negative integration in favour of liberal market
economies as opposed to social market economies has been thoroughly
addressed by eminent scholars of the Max Planck Institute for the Study
of Societies; see F.W. Scharpf, ‘The Double Asymmetry of European
Integration Or: Why the EU Cannot Be a Social Market Economy’, 8
Socio-Economic Review 211 (2010); M. Höpner and A. Schäfer, ‘Inte-
gration among Unequals: How the Heterogeneity of European Varieties
of Capitalism Shapes the Social and Democratic Potential of the EU’,
MPIfG Discussion Paper No. 12/5 (2012); M. Höpner and A. Schäfer,
‘A New Phase of European Integration: Organized Capitalisms in Post-
Ricardian Europe’, 33 West European Politics 344 (2010); M. Höpner
and A. Schäfer, ‘Embeddedness and Regional Integration. Waiting for
Polanyi in a Hayekian Setting’, 66 International Organization 429
(2012). The latest contribution to the debate about the model of mar-
ket economy in Europe came very recently by Advocate General Wahl.
In his recent opinion in AGET Iraklis, he stated – in the very first para-
graph – that the ‘European Union is based on a free market economy,
which implies that undertakings must have the freedom to conduct
their business as they see fit’. This rather sweeping statement seems to
disregard the reference to ‘social market economy’ in Art. 3 TEU. See
Opinion of Advocate General Wahl delivered on 9 June 2016 in the
Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis.
85. Gerner-Beuerle, above n. 73, at 124.
86. However, this assumption is not empirically proven. In 2005, Oxera,
authorised by the European Commission, provided an overview of the
special rights retained by public authorities in privatised companies in
the EU and an evaluation of their economic impact on the performance
of affected companies. The Report examined six companies (Cimpor,
Volkswagen, Repsol YPF, KPN, Portugal Telecom and BAA) and conclu-
ded that special rights held by public authorities tend to have a negative
impact on the longer-term economic performance of EU privatised
companies because four of the six companies examined tended to
underperform relative to comparable companies not subject to special
rights. However, the remaining two companies outperformed their
comparators and, thus, this contradictory evidence was not consistent
with the hypothesis that the impact of special rights is negative. Accord-
ingly, Oxera concluded that: ‘… although there is some indication of a
negative impact of special rights, the evidence obtained from the
benchmarking analysis is disparate and does not allow any strong con-
clusions to be drawn. However, the results do not imply that special
rights have no negative impact on companies’ long-term performance’.
See Oxera, above n. 53, at 68.
87. Gerner-Beuerle, above n. 73. See also M. O’Brien, ‘Case C-326/07,
Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic, Judg-
ment of the Court of Justice (Third Chamber) of 26 March 2009’, 47
Common Market Law Review 245, at 260 (2010), who criticises the
Court for being ‘very strict in its refusal to allow Member States to exer-
cise control over ownership of shares, voting rights and management
decision-making in private companies through golden share mecha-
nisms’.
any type of special shareholding would amount to a
restriction on capital movements. This would in turn
mean that the free movement of capital is horizontally
applicable and captures also acts of private shareholders,
an interpretation that would have serious implications
for the fundamental principle of private autonomy.88
Such a reading of the Treaty is open to question, as the
constitutional foundations of the Internal Market do not
seem to allow such a broad interpretation. Surely, the
wording of Article 63 TFEU provides for the prohibi-
tion of ‘all restrictions’ on capital movements without
any allusion to discrimination. However, this cannot be
regarded as a carte blanche to abolish all national compa-
ny law requirements that could potentially dissuade for-
eign investors from investing their capital in undertak-
ings with mechanisms that do not adhere completely to
shareholders’ primacy. In his insightful contribution,
Harm Schepel argues that the golden shares case law so
far has advanced the rule that corporations should be
governed with a view to maximise shareholders’ profit
to such an extent that it has turned Article 63 TFEU
into a ‘Charter of Shareholder Rights’.89 It has managed
to elevate the shareholders’ primacy principle to a con-
stitutional norm underpinning capital liberalisation.90
However, the Court’s underlying narrative is based on a
utopian nostalgia for the traditional forms of capitalism.
The transformations of modern economy have led to a
high degree of ‘financialisation’, which is currently asso-
88. So far the Court has qualified the contested ‘golden shares’ as ‘State
measures’ and has thus refrained from ruling explicitly on the question
as to whether Article 63 TFEU is horizontally applicable (see Joined
Cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 Commission v. The Netherlands, at 22;
Case C-112/05 Commission v. Germany, at 27-29). However, Advo-
cate General Maduro has advocated a horizontal applicability of the
free movement of capital, noting that even when the State acts like any
other shareholder under general company law, Article 63 TFEU should
be applicable (see Advocate General Maduro in Joined Cases C-282/04
and C-283/04, Commission v. The Netherlands, para. 24). For an aca-
demic discussion, see Gerner-Beuerle, above n. 73; W. Ringe, ‘Is Volks-
wagen the New Centros? Free movement of Capital’s Impact on Com-
pany Law’, in Dan Prentice and Arad Reisberg (eds.), Corporate Finance
Law in the UK and EU (2011) 461; Saam and Zumbansen, above n. 61;
H. Schepel, ‘Constitutionalising the Market, Marketising the Constitu-
tion, and to Tell the Difference: On the Horizontal Application of the
Free Movement Provisions in EU Law’, 18 European Law Journal 177
(2012); E. Szyszczak, ‘Golden Shares and Market Governance’, 29 Legal
Issues of Economic Integration 255 (2002).
89. H. Schepel, ‘Of Capitalist Nostalgia and Financialisation: Shareholder
Primacy in the Court of Justice’, in C. Joerges and C. Glinski (eds.), The
European Crisis and the Transformation of Transnational Governan
(2014) 143.
90. Ibid., at 144.
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ciated with rising stagnation in the real economy, social
inequalities and high levels of unemployment.91
The choice of corporate governance model is a highly
political question, which depends on various socioeco-
nomic factors that differ across the globe. Carsten Gern-
er-Beuerle is right in doubting whether the Court of
Justice, the judicial institution of the EU, could or
should decide on such sensitive and highly political
questions of national economic policy.92 This question
essentially boils down to the observance of the funda-
mental principle of separation of powers in the EU poli-
ty. The Court has been on several occasions accused of
engaging in judicial activism,93 which causes confusion
as to its role as the judicial institution of the EU.
Although this might sometimes be an overstatement,
the fact remains that the role of the Court should be
limited to what Article 19 TEU prescribes: to ensure
that in the interpretation and application of the Trea-
ties, the ‘law’ is observed.
Whether corporate governance should be dominated by
the shareholders’ primacy norm is a political question
and should be clearly distinguished from the objective
of market integration pursued by the Treaties.94 It is
doubtful whether the Court is the appropriate institu-
tion to design the corporate governance policy of the
Member States. It is therefore argued that the premise
of an over-inclusive interpretation of Article 63 TFEU
cannot be reconciled with the discretion of the Member
States in the field of corporate governance and the exis-
tence of different kinds of national company law
regimes, which do not adhere strictly to the principle of
proportionality between ownership and management.
This by no means should be interpreted as leaving room
for suspicious State interferences that could lead to seri-
ous market abuses and distortions of competition. The
Court should not refrain from disapplying distinctly or
91. Ibid., at 152. On the highly topical issue of the interplay between capi-
tal liberalisation and social inequalities, see the recent bestseller of T.
Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014). But it is not only
left-wing economists who question the positive outcomes of capital lib-
eralisation. Recently, the critique emanated from the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), the institutional advocate of the international finan-
cial system. In an article published in its flagship magazine, three of the
IMF’s top economists argue that instead of delivering growth, two neo-
liberal policies have increased inequality, and in turn jeopardised the
level and sustainability of growth. These two policies are, first, capital
account liberalisation (i.e. removing restrictions on the movement of
capital across a country’s borders) and, second, fiscal consolidation (i.e.
austerity). See J.D. Ostry, P. Loungani & D. Furceri, ‘Neoliberalism:
Oversold?’, 53 Finance & Development 38 (2016).
92. Gerner-Beuerle, above n. 73, at 125, especially in the light of the politi-
cal controversies during the negotiations for the adoption of the Euro-
pean Takeover Directive. For a thorough analysis, see Höpner and Schä-
fer, above n. 83.
93. The problem of securing respect for the rule of law by the Union itself
and the debate about ‘competence creep’ by the Union institutions
(including the Court of Justice in the exercise of its judicial functions)
has been aptly addressed by the recent Editorial of the Common Market
Law Review, wondering whether this is a Union that sacrifices its own
rule of law on the altar of political expediency. See Editorial Comments,
‘The Rule of Law in the Union, the Rule of Union Law and the Rule of
Law by the Union: Three interrelated problems’, 53 Common Market
Law Review 597, at 599-600 (2016).
94. Gerner-Beuerle, above n. 73, at 126.
indistinctly national measures that obstruct capital flows
and undermine the process of economic integration.
However, it should respect the discretion of the Mem-
ber States to decide on the corporate governance regime
of their national economy, and it should intervene only
when the national choices seriously undermine the
objectives of market integration either by discriminating
against foreign investors or by hindering the market
access of foreign investors in derogation from ordinary
company law.
Its prime objective should not be the maximisation of
shareholders’ profit, but the establishment of a well-
functioning and integrated market economy, which
respects the national policy choices as expressed
through various mechanisms of national company law.
This is why the question of whether the contested meas-
ure derogates from domestic company law has been a
recurring theme in the golden shares case law and right-
ly so. It appears that it is the only criterion so far that
can contribute to the development of a reasonable and
coherent test to assess whether special shareholding in
privatised undertakings constitutes restrictions on capi-
tal movements.95
It is thus proposed that a refined three-step test could
be adopted in order to define capital restrictions.96 It
operates in the following way:
1. Discrimination on grounds of nationality. The first step
asks whether there is discrimination on grounds of
nationality. Special shareholding that discriminates
between domestic and foreign investors constitutes a
blatant restriction on the free movement of capital,
which can be justified only by the grounds provided
for in the Treaty.
2. Derogation from ordinary company law. The special
shareholding that does not discriminate on grounds
of nationality may be divided into two subcategories:
(a) indistinctly applicable special shareholding that
does not derogate from ordinary company law and
does not exclude private shareholders can be regar-
ded as investment arrangements (i.e. rules that struc-
ture the market and form the corporate governance
regime of a Member State). These investment
arrangements fall outside the scope of Article 63
TFEU. (b) Indistinctly applicable special sharehold-
ing that derogates from ordinary company law and it
is available only to the State (to the exclusion of pri-
vate investors) that constitutes a restriction on the
free movement of capital prohibited under Article 63
TFEU. It can then be examined whether it can be
justified by overriding reasons in the public interest
in accordance with the principle of proportionality.
95. Ibid., at 108. However, the author admits that company law is a highly
complex field of law with many different variations, exceptions and spe-
cial provisions, making the determination of what complies with or der-
ogates from ordinary company law a rather intricate and challenging
exercise, at 138.
96. It should be noted that this article focuses on how to determine wheth-
er a special shareholding constitutes a capital restriction. The question
of whether a capital restriction is justified by a legitimate objective and
proportionate to the attainment of that objective is not addressed here.
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3. Positive effect on capital movements. The third step
relates only to indistinctly applicable special share-
holding that derogates from ordinary company law
(subcategory (b) in step 2). Such measures are pre-
sumed to hinder the market access of foreign invest-
ors. However, this presumption is rebuttable. The
Member State can provide convincing evidence prov-
ing that the existence of the golden shares in the
undertaking concerned has actually encouraged capi-
tal movements. Although it is acknowledged that this
criterion bears certain weaknesses, it could neverthe-
less temper the premise that the mere existence of
golden shares restricts capital movements.
Overall, the conceptual foundation of the test that is
being proposed here is the theory of economic suprana-
tionalism as opposed to economic constitutionalism.97
Indistinctly applicable measures should be regarded as
restricting the free movement of capital only if the
Member State is making use of its public regulatory
powers to structure the market in its favour by derogat-
ing from ordinary company law. The mere assumption
that the State participation in a corporate structure in
accordance with national company law hinders the mar-
ket access of foreign investors is an overly broad inter-
pretation of Article 63 TFEU, which oversteps the
boundaries of the constitutional foundations of market
integration. The refined test on capital restrictions
would allow the Court to exercise thorough and scrupu-
lous oversight of national rules that unjustifiably grant
privileges to the State, while at the same time ensuring
that it does not oversteps the boundaries of its judicial
powers by implicitly imposing a specific corporate gov-
ernance regime on the Member States.
5 Conclusion
The ‘great transformation’98 of modern economies has
brought about fundamental changes in the structure and
functioning of the Internal Market. These changes
require a redetermination of the rationale underlying
negative integration and a refinement of the market
access test applied by the Court in the free movement
case law. This test has undergone a significant evolution
since the 1970s, and it can now be said that it has
emerged as the predominant criterion for the establish-
ment of a trade restriction. The Keck-distinction
between product rules and selling arrangements –
despite its theoretical appeal – has proved inadequate in
practice. Nevertheless, it contributed greatly to the
growing awareness of the need to clearly delineate the
outer limits of the free movement provisions. This
delineation guarantees legal certainty and allows demo-
cratically elected governments to exercise their national
regulatory autonomy within the framework of the Inter-
97. Gerner-Beuerle, above n. 73, at 141.
98. To borrow the title of the seminal work by K. Polanyi, The Great Trans-
formation (1944).
nal Market. In the field of the free movement of goods,
while the Keck-formula is ostensibly still considered to
be good law, the market access test has practically pre-
vailed, though in a shape that is qualified by de minimis
considerations expressed in the form of a ‘substantial
hindrance on market access’. This serves as a safety net
that allows the Court to uphold the legality of regulatory
requirements with inappreciable effect on trade, while at
the same time ensuring that national measures substan-
tially hindering market access of foreign operators are
set aside. Most of the time, this test has been applied
successfully and together with the justifications/manda-
tory requirements and the prudent proportionality test
has managed to strike a fair balance between economic
freedom and societal values expressed in the form of
overriding reasons in the public interest.
However, this has not been achieved in capital case law.
The free movement of capital is different from the other
freedoms in that it presupposes the existence of a regu-
latory framework.99 Many national rules that could be
regarded as obstacles to capital movements essentially
‘establish the market and thus make capital movements
possible in the first place’.100 This means that the identi-
fication of capital restrictions is a particularly delicate
exercise.
So far the Court’s reasoning is based on the premise that
all golden shares are by definition restrictions on capital
movements, as they discourage foreign investors from
acquiring shares in privatised undertakings in which the
State retains some special rights. This article has
attempted to identify the potential flaws in this legal
reasoning and has questioned the assumption that the
free movement of capital as enshrined in the Treaty
advocates a corporate governance regime based on the
shareholders’ primacy principle. Drawing from the case
law in goods, it is argued that the wide interpretation of
capital restrictions could be narrowed down by the
application of a Keck-inspired test that would allow
Member States acting as shareholders of strategically
sensitive privatised companies to protect public interest
requirements, especially when the undertaking con-
cerned provides services of general economic interest.
While the acceptance of investments arrangements in
the capital case law might seem unlikely in the near
future,101 the Court could nevertheless further develop
the derogation from ordinary company law criterion in
order to promote capital liberalisation, without, howev-
er, imposing a certain model of capitalism and corporate
governance on the Member States.
99. Gerner-Beuerle, above n. 73, at 136.
100. Ibid., at 137 citing Barnard (2014), above n. 8, at 245.
101. Biondi, above n. 4, at 96-97.
188
ELR December 2016 | No. 4 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000068
